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THE LINE·ITEM VETO 
TUESDAY, APRIL 11, 1989 
U.S. SENATE, 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, 
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 
_. \ Washington, DC. 
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in room 
SD-226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Paul Simon (chair-
man of the subcommittee) presiding. 
Also present: Senators Hatch and Specter. 
(1) 
2 
lOlST CONGRESS S J RES 14 1ST S ESSION 
•• • 
Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States to allow the 
President to veto items of appropriation. 
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 
JANUARY 25 (legislative day, JANUARY 3), 1989 
II 
Mr. THURMOND (for himself, Mr. ,,1 AI.LOP, Mr. BAUCUS, Mr. D' A~lATO, Mr. 
- PRESSLER, Mr. BOND, Mr. GRASSLEY, Mr. MCCLURE, Mr. SYMMS, Mr. 
EXON, Mrs. KASSEBAUM, Mr. SIMPSON, Mr. NICKLES, Mr. BURDICK, Mr. 
CONRAD, Mr. DECONCINI, Mr. HARKIN, Mr. DANFORTH, Mr. DOLE, and 
Mr. LUCiAR) introduced the following joint r('solution; which was read twice 
and referred to the Committee on the IJ udiciary 
JOINT RES"OLUTION 
Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States to allow the President to veto items of appropriation. 
1 RelJolved by the Senate and House of Representatives 
2 of the United Stales of America in Congress assembled 
3 (two-thirds of each House concurring therein), That the fol-
4 10\\1ng article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitu- -
5 tion, which shall be valid tOi all intents and purposes as part 
6 of the Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of three-
7 fourth. of the everal States within seven yea.rs after the date 
8 of it. IUbmi .ion to the States lor ratification: 
.r 
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[Recess.] 
Senator SIMON. I apologize. It has just been one of those days 
where things have not gone well timewise. 
I am pleased to have you here, and let me call first on Mr. 
Arnold Cantor, the assistant director of the economic research de-
partment of the AFL-CIO. 
Mr. Cantor. 
PAN~~L CONSISTING OF ARNOLD CANTOR, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, . 
ECONOMIC Rf.~SEARCH DEPARTMEN1\ AFL-CIO; NEAL DEVINS, 
ASSISTANT PRO.'f.~SSOR OF LAW, COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND ' 
MARY; AND LOUIS FISHER, SENIOR AMERICAN SPECIALIST, :. 
GOVI~RNMENT DIVISION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV. ·· 
I(~.~ 
STATEMENT OF ARNOLD CANTOR 
Mr. CANTOR. Thank you, Senator. I will kind of paraphrase. I 
assume the full statement will go in the record. 
Senator SIMON. We will put your full statements in the record. 
Mr. C ANTOR. Thank you. On behalf of the AFL-CIO, we are ap-
pearing in opposition to both the measures. We would also oppose 
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establishing such authority through statute. We believe that the 
President has sufficient power and opportunity under existing law 
to assert his influence and control over the budget and appropria-
tions processes, as well as on a program-by-program or line-by-line 
basis. 
First, and perhaps of greatest importance, is the fact that a line-
item veto goes far beyond budgetary matters and involves far more 
than a simpie procedural change. We believe the line-item veto, in 
effect, would give the Executive powers to amend legislation, sub-
stitute his will fot that of the Congress, and thereby substantially 
alter the present mix and balance of powers between the executive 
and legislative branches of government. 
In terms of direct and specific line-item powers, under the 
Budget Control and Impoundment Act of 1974 the President can 
utilize the rescission process, and although both Houses must ap-
provE. the rescission by a simple majority, the record clearly dem-
onstrates that the President does get his way. 
In addition, there are basic powers of the Executive to garner 
media coverage and get public attention focused on any line-item 
program he feels is not worthwhile. The President has the power to 
call Congress into special session as a means to aSRert his will and 
influence, and the present veto power of the President can and is 
used as a threat and a bargaining chip to influence the shape of 
any line item. 
The President can also request supplemental appropriations, and 
the sequestration procedure provides additional opportunities for 
the administration to influence the funding of particular programs. 
We also feel that the Congress, particularly as a result of the 
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, has 
more than enough procedural constraints and limitations on its 
budgetary powers. 
Line-item veto authority could complicate and politicize the 
budget process in a fashion that could be contrary to the national 
interest, and at the same time have, at best, a minuscule effect on 
the overall spending and revenue totals and the size of the deficit. 
It is unlikely that line-item veto power would apply uniformly 
throughout the budget. Rather, for one reason or another, signifi-
cant portions of the budget could or would not be subject to the 
veto power. 
We also feel that the figures imply that the relatively few pro-
grams that. are controllable would be disproportionately burdened. 
This, in our view, could lead to a counterproductive game of budg-
etary chicken' between the White House and the Congress~ with 
certain programs held host~ge by the administration's line-item 
veto _power. Also, w~ feel there is the potential for a highly parti-
san White House to use the th"~at of veto power for electoral gain. 
Thus, we do not feel that such circumstances would be conducive 
to the development of a budget that reflects the Nation's priorities 
and spells out the manner in which those priorities will be fi-
nanced, nor we do believe that the line-item veto accords with the 
Congres ' legislative anthority as envisioned by the drafters of the 
Constitutjon , 
Thank you, 
(The prepared statement of Mr. Cantor follows:] 
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Testimony of Arnold cantor, Assistant Director, Economic Research Department 
American Federation of Labor and Congress of industrial Organizations 
and 
Jerry D. Klepner, Director of Legislation 
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees 
Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution, Senate Committee of Judiciary 
on SJ. 1. and 5.3. 23, Line Item Veto 
April 11, 1989 
89-11 
We -are pleased to appear on behalf of the AFL-CIO in opposition to measures to 
expand the powers of the President through establishment of a line-item veto. 
We are opposed to granting of such powers through the Constitutional amendment 
route as called for in S.J. 14 and S.J. 23, the two resolutions before this subcoIT.mittee, and 
we would also oppose estabkishing such authority by statute. 
We believe that the President has sufficient power and opportunity under existing laws 
to assert his influence and control over the federal budget and appropriations process as well 
as on a program-by-program or line-by-line basis. 
First, and of perhaps greatest importance is the fact that a line-item veto goes far 
beyond budgetary matters and involves far more than a simple pr0c::..dural change. We 
believe the line-item veto in effect would give the executive powers to amend legislation, 
substitute his will for that of the Congress and thereby substantialIy alter the present mix 
and balance of powers between the executive and legislative branches of government. 
Under current budget procedures the President's powers are formidable. It is first of 
all the President who is empowered to take the initiative by developing a detailed 
comprehensive budget and submitting his budget to the Congress. It is the President's 
budget that establishes the overall framework and the context within which compromises 
are made and a federal budget is ultimately developed. 
Moreover in terms of direct and specific line-item powers, under the Budget Control 
and Impoundment Act of 1974 the President can utilize the rescission process. Although 
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both houses must approve of the rescission by simple majority the record clearly 
demonstrates that the President gets his way. In the first two years of the Reagan 
JI~dministration, for example, Congress approved 80 percent of the rescission requests, and 
during the past eight years, 32 percent of the number of rescissions were approved 
representing 95 percent of the dollar cuts recommended ($43.8 billion). 
In addition of course: 
(I) there are basic powers of the Executive to garner media coverage and get public 
attention focussed on any line-item program he feels is not worthwhile; 
(2) the President has the power to call Congress into special session as a means to 
assert his will and influence; and 
(3) the present veto power of the President can, and is used as a threat and a 
bargaining chip tt" influence the shape of any "line-item." The President can also request 
supplemental appropriations and the sequestration procedure provides additional 
opportunities for the Administration to influence the funding of particular programs. 
We also feel the Congress, particularly as a result of the Balanced Budget and 
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, has more than enough procedural constraints and 
Jimitatie:ns on its budgetary powers. 
Line-item veto authority could complicate and politicize the budget process in a 
fashion that could be contrary to the national interest and at the same time have at best a 
miniscule effect on the overalJ spending and revenue totals and the size of the deficit. It is 
unlikely that line-item veto power would apply uniformly throughout the budget. Rather, 
for one reason or anothp.r, significant portions of the budget could or would not be subject to 
the veto power. Interest on the national debt, a large ($170 billion) and fast growing line-
item, could not be subjected to a veto. Social security, medicare, unemployment assistance 
and the like are all mandatory entitlements and substantial portions of the outlays for 
otherwise "discretionary" programs and categories reflect contractual expenditures frorn-
prior year authoriz3tions and could not be subject to a veto. 
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The Budget for fiscal 1990, for example, categorizes $902.3 billion in outlays-7S.4 
percent of the total budget-as "relatively uncontrollable" (page 10-26). 
Although some of these programs perhaps are less "uncontrollable" than others, the 
figure:; indicate clearly that the veto as a deficit reduction measure could have a very small 
impact. These figures also imply that the relatively few programs that are controllable 
would be disproportionately burdened. This in our view could lead to a counter productive 
game of budgetary "chicken" between the White House and th-e Congress with certain 
programs held hostage by the Administration's veto power. Also, there is the potential for a 
highly partisan White House to use the threat of veto power for electoral gain. 
We do not feel that such circumstances would be conducive to the development of a 
budget that reflects the nation's priorities and spells out the manner in which those 
priorities will be financed. Nor do we believe that the line-item veto accords with the 
Congress' legislative authority as envisioned by the drafters of the Constitution. 
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Second, even if an item is returned to Congress for override, it is 
possible-quite possible, I think-that the Congress is going to be 
reluctant to use its override power. The item veto, in a sense, pre-
sumes that the President knows better when it comes to fiscal 
policy, and I think symbolically, Congress is going to be hesitant, 
even with respect to a simple majority, to override those Presiden-
tial decisions. 
Finally, on the balance of power issue, I don't think the item 
veto restores the President's power, With respect to budgetary 
power, the President does not have the vested right to have his 
budget dominate the Government. The budget power for the Presi-
dent originates thr-ough the 1921 act, and that act clearly shows 
fhat the Congress' budget priorities take precedence over that of 
the President. 
Moreover, with respect to omnibus measures, I think it is fre-
quently misperceived that omnibus measures hurt the President 
and help Congress. President Reagan's legislative master stroke, in 
fact, was the 1981 Omnibus Act. There, he was a strong advocate of 
omnibus measures as a way to eliminate waste in an efficient 
manner. 
Another example of omnibus measures expanding Presidential 
po~!er is the fiscal year 1988 continuing resolution. There, the 
President was quite successful, having Congress concede with re-
spect to Contra aid and the fairness doctrine, by threatening to use 
his veto po\ver. 
I would like to now move quickly to the question of judicial inter-
pretation. As I said, words like "item" and words like "appropria-
tion" may Inake perfect sense to you and I. But since the Constitu-
tion does not distinguish the authorization process from the appro-
priations process, there are going to be many problems of interpre-
tation. 
For example, is a condition on spending, such a limitation rider, 
an appropriation? It is part of an appropriation bill. What about 
budgetary matters contained in authorizations? They concern the 
budget, but are they an appropriation or not? You know, for exam-
ple, Congress can place its appropriations in authorizations meas-
ures. Does that protect the Congress from an item veto? 
These matters are going to be subject to interpretation by the 
courts and, as the States' experience demonstrates, we are going to 
get conflicting interpretations. Therefore, you simply don't know 
what you get with the item veto. 
For these reasons, I think the item veto is a dangerous constitu-
tional experiment. 
[The prepared statement of Mr. Devins follows:] 
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Senator SIMON. Thank you very much. 
Prof. Neal Devins, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of Wil-
liam and Mary. We are happy to have you with us, Professor 
Devins. 
STATEMENT OF NEAL DEVINS 
Mr. DEVINS. 1'hank you, Senator Simon. I appreciate the opportu-
nity. There are four principal objections to the item veto, some of 
which have been said before; a couple, I will add. 
First, as Senators Byrd and Hatfield have noted, the States' ex-
perience with the item veto is a mixed experience and has clearly 
not been uniformly positive, especially with respect to partisan pol-
itics playing a large role. 
Second, even if the States' experience was uniformly positive, as 
was mentioned before by Senator Hatfield, from the States you 
cannot analogize to the Federal budget process. There are simply 
too many differences between the State and the Federal systems. 
Third, with respect to the balance of power, and there has been 
some discussion of this before as well, the item veto, even with the 
simple majority override proposed through Senate Joint Resolution 
23, will dramatically alter the balance between the President and 
Congress in a manner that favors the President. 
Moreover, the complaint that omnibus bills hurt the President, is 
misplaced. The President frequently benefits from omnibus bills, 
- even wIth respect to preserving his veto power. 
Fourth, and finally, the item veto will be subject to judicial inter-
pretation. While it might be clear in the minds of yourself and 
other sponsors what words like "item" and "appropriation" mean, 
it is probably not so clear in the eyes of the courts. The experience 
of the State courts in determining the sweep of gubernatorial item-
veto authority bears this out. 
I would like to focus on my second two comments, the balance of 
power concern and the concern over judicial interpretation. 
With respect to the balance of power, it seems to me that when 
the Congress and the President are of different parties, the likeli-
hood for conflict with respect to the item veto is particularly acute. 
The States' experience does bear this out. When Governor and 
State legislature are of different parties, there are many item veto 
conflicts. 
Congress' override cannot protect against this phenomenon. I 
have heard you and some of the other sponsors mention today that, 
it is only a simple majority override, and therefore the override 
will protect legislative prerogatives. 
But it is important to keep two things in mind. First, the Presi-
dent controls that which is subject to being overridden in the first 
place. Consequently, if the President favors a wasteful program, it 
ifJ not subject to item veto at all because he keeps it and does not 
veto it. It is only that which he feels he affirmatively vetoes that is 
presented to the.Congres8 for possible override. 
This, of course, will preserve his priorities. It may also protect 
the priorities of powerful legislators that the President does not 
want to upset through the use of his item-veto power. 
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STATEMENT OF NEAL DEVINS, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF LAW, 
COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY 
Chairman Simon and Members of the Committee: 
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss proposed constitutional amendments to 
authorize an item veto for the President. My remarks will focus on S.J. Res. 14 -
authorizing the President to "disapprove any item of appropriation" subject to traditional 
two-thirds override - and S.J .Res. 23 - empowering the President to "reduce or 
disapprove any item of appropriation" subject to majority override. 
Sponsor statements in support of these proposals are drawn by two impulses. 
First, Congress lacks sufficient "fiscal discipline" to Significantly reduce the federal 
deficit. Reliance on "staff, and the knowledge, cha~acter, and ability of th~ 
subcommittee chairman and ranking Members" has proven inadequate. Gr&mm-Rudman-
Hollings, at present, appears little more than "blue smoke and mirrors." President Bush, 
moreover, has suggested numerous costly initiatives. Immediate action is therefore 
necessary. While the item_veto is not a panacea, it is a necessary forward step. Porty-
three states have it and "it works." Furthermore, Congressional approval of the item 
veto sends "a clear message to the American public that we are making a serious effort 
to get our fiscal house in order." Second, the increasing use of omnibus legislation has 
weakened the President's veto. The item veto therefore "helps restore" the appropriate 
balance of power between President and Congress. At the same time, in the case of S.J. 
Res. 23, concern over the possible "creation of an imperial presidency" cautions against a 
super-majority override and in favor of override by a "simple constitutional majority." 
"Stated another way," S.J. Res. 23 sees the item veto as a mechanism to ensure that a 
majority of legislators actually supports items in previously enacted bills. 
An examination of state experiences with the item veto 8.nd President Reagan's 
experiences with omnibus legislation raises doubts about both propositions. Problems of 
judicial interpretation and escalating interbranch connict likewise cautions against these 
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1. The Item Veto and the Fisc 
Proponents of a presidential item veto as a tool to redress the chronic inability of 
the federal government to control spending and budget deficits point to the fact that 
most governors have this authority. Yet, state experience with the item veto has been 
unquestionably mixed. 
The item veto has a-reputation for saving money and some evidence supports this 
characterization) Several studies, however, call into question the item veto's 
effectiveness for reducing expenditures. As Senator Mark Hatfield, who was governor of 
Oregon from 1958-1966, testified before this Committee in 1984: 
Legislators in states which have the line-item veto routinely 
"pad" their budgets. It is a wonderful way for a Democratic-
controlled legislature to put a Republican Govemor on the 
spot: Let him be the one to line-item these issues that were 
either politically popular, or very emotional.2 
Studies from Pennsylvania and Michigan support this conclusion.3 
Available evidence, moreover, suggests that the item veto often functions as a 
partisan political tool and causes strife between the executive and legislative branches in 
state government. A 1935 study comparing 28 states found the item veto more likely to 
be used in states where the legislature and governor were flOm opposing parties.4 A 
1986 Wisconsin study likewise concluded that the item veto has been used primarily as a . 
tool of polley making and partisan politics.5 A 1985 review of nllnois Governor 
Thompson's use of the item veto concluded that the veto triggered numerous political 
battles.6 Finally, a 1984 review by the House Budget Committee concluded that "hlhe 
power of the Une-item veto on the states has given rise to significant poUtical strife 
which has, at times f threatened the shutdown of Govemment services and withholding of 
peyments.,,7 
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from lump sum funding to single item funding. Such a change would eliminate existing 
advantages to Congress and executive agencies associated with lump sum funding. 
Preexisting budgetary demands also speak against a presidential item veto. Half 
of Il1l federal outlays are not contained in appropriations. Entitlements such as Social 
. Security and Medicare as well as interest on the national debt are all within the 
jurisdiction of the tax committees. Moreover, appropriations which further presidential 
priorities are effectively veto proof. For example, in light of President Reagan's 
commitment to maintaining defense spending, a Reagan administraHon item veto-at 
best-would have applied to less than fifteen percent of the budget. Indeed, the 
President's 1985 Economic Report ~luntly proclaimed that the item veto "may not have a 
substantial effect on total federal expenditures" but may be used by the President "to 
change the composition of federal expenditures-from activities preferred by the 
Congress to activities preferred by the President. "11 
A Bush-era item veto might well operate much the same way. As Senator Dixon 
recognized: "Let us not forget a number of costly initiatives have been discussed by 
President Bush. Where does the money ~ome for these initiatives when the deficit 
continues to eat away at our ability to meet the needs of the country." 
2. The Item Veto and the Balance of Power 
The item veto's role as fiscal salvo tells only part of the proponent's story. 
Proponents also argue that the item veto restores-in the face of veto-proof omnibus 
legislation-essenti&l presidential power. Irrespective of whether the framers would 
approve of a presidential item veto,12 I find this argument shortsighted. Omnibus 
legislation has not proven the downfall of either the presidency or the veto power. I 3 
President Reagan, for example, was w'ell served by the 1981 Omnibus 
ReconeUiation Act. According to Louis Fisher, "the omnibus nature of the bill was 
championed by the White nouse and presidential supporters as the only way to make cuts 
in popul&r program •• "14 Reagan-era omnibus continuing resolutions, moreover, did not 
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More significant, even if the states' experiences with the item veto were 
uniformly positive, state govemments are too different from the federal govemment to 
serve as useful models for a presidential item veto. Unlike state constitutions, which 
have a strong antilegislative bias, a balanced budget requirement, and speC!lfic controls 
on the prooess of authorizing and appropriating funds, the federal Constitution contains 
few limitations on the spending power and is silent on the procedures to be adopted by 
Congress to authorize and appropriate funds. 8 
Congress may today appropriate by tax committees, legislative committees, and 
appropriations committees. If Congress chose to do so, it could place subsu.ntive 
legislation in appropriations bills and allow authorization committees to fund programs 
directly through the use of "backdoor spending." These matters are left exclusively to 
House and Senate rules and to Congress' interpretation and execution of its rules. Unlike 
states that include specifications for the style and format of appropriations bills, 
Congress may decide to appropriate only in large, lump sum amounts, eliminating from 
the bill specific projects and activities that the President hoped to veto. In fact, 
Congress and the executive agencies both prefer lump sum funding to accommodate the 
need for administrative discretion.9 To protect its interests, Congress relies to a large 
extent on nonstatutory controls, specifying the allocation of lump sum amounts in such 
places as committee reports. IO Unless Congress substantially alters the structure of 
appropriations bills, the item veto would give the President little additional control over 
individual projects, programs, or activities. 
Item reduction power would strengthen the President's hand in this regard. 
Presumably, the President could eliminate unnecess~ pork from omnibus "items." 
There are two problems here. First, the President is under no obligatio. ... to expend a 
"reduced" appropriation in a manner which Congress approves. The reduced 
appropriation simply means that some approved expenditures will not go forward. 
""~f in order to exereiH meanil1l'ful control, Congress may be foreed to move away 
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from lump sum funding to single item funding. Such a change would eliminate existing 
advantages to Congress and executive agencies associated with lump sum funding. 
Preexisting budgetary demands also speak against a presidential item veto. Half 
of till federal outlays are not contained in appropriations. Entitlements such as Social 
. Security and Medicare as well as interest on the national debt are all within the 
jurisdiction of the tax committees. Moreover, appropriations which further presidential 
priorities are effectively veto proof. For example, in light of President Reagan's 
commitment to maintaining defense spending, a Reagan administrat:on item veto-at 
best-would have applied to less than fifteen percent of the budget. Indeed, the 
President's 1985 Economic Report bluntly proclaimed that the item veto "may not have a 
substantial effect on total federal expenditures" but may be used by the President "to 
change the composition of federal expenditures-from activities preferred by the 
Congress to activities preferred by the President. "11 
A Bush-era item veto might well operate much the same way. As Senator Dixon 
recognized: "Let us not forget a number of costly initiatives have been discussed by 
President Bush. Where does the money \!ome for these initiatives when the deficit 
continues to eat away at our ability to meet the needs of the country." 
2. The Item Veto and the Balance of Power 
The item veto's role as fiscal salvo tells only part of the proponent's story. 
Proponents also argue that the item veto restores-in the face of veto-proof omnibus 
legislation-essential presidential power. Irrespective of whether the framers would 
approve of a presidential item veto,12 I find this argument shortsighted. Omnibus 
legislation hai': not prov~n the downfall of either the presidency or the veto power.13 
President Reagan, for example, was well served by the 1981 Omnibus 
Reconciliation Act. According to Louis Fisher, "the omnibus nature of the bill was 
championed by the White nouse and presidential supporters as the only way to make cuts 
In populAr programs ... "14 Reagan-era omnibus continuing resolutions, moreover, did not 
'.~ -' 
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undermine the veto power. Although omnibus legislation changes the nature of the 
exchange be~ween the White House and Congress, the veto still functions as a mediating 
device. For e)"ample, with respect to the FY 88 continuing resolution, the White House 
and Congress undertook exter~ive n~otiations to ensure that the bill was satisfactory to 
both sides. In the ,end, Congress abandonc1 the fairness doctrine and included Contra aid 
to stave off a threatened veto. If anything, such legislative \!Ompromises reveal that a 
President who is wilUng to u:"',e his veto wields enormous t.'0wer in such negotiations. 
The vitality of the veto power therefore cannot be measured by its exercise. 
Rather, the effectiveness of the veto power must be measured by h:s impact on the 
political process. The "all <.'r nothing" stakes of omnibus legislation enabled President 
Reagan to enhance his veto power through a threatened exercise. As a matter of simple 
mathematics, frequency of use is also a poor measure of the veto power's impact. Prior 
to the present era of omnibus lel~islation, the presidential veto has been infrequent.1.y 
used. IS Washington vetoed only two bills. Seven presidents never used the power. Two 
presidents (Roosevelt and Cleveland) account for roughly half of all vetoes. In short, 
while the veto power may be underutilized, the advent of omnibus legislation is not the 
cause of infrequent use. 
The item veto, moreover, cannot be understood as a mechanism to restore 
essential presidential prerogatives in the budget process. Prior to 1921, the President 
had no final budgetary responsibilities. The Budget Act of 1921 r£quired the President to 
submit a formal bu~et. At the same time, Congress was free to do with the budget as it 
saw fit. The 1974 Budget Act, while setting explicit limits on the President's 
impoundment authority, did not alter this basic relationship. Item veto and reduction, 
bowver, will alter this basic relationship. As Louis Fisher observed in pri?r testimony on 
u.e item veto: "The final size and shape of the budget will resemble to a much greater 
deIree what the President submitted."IB 
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s~ J. Res. 23 proponents say fear not; Congress's simple majority override 
will preserve legislative priorities. Specifically, S.J. Res: 23 envisions the item veto as a 
I • 
check on items which are not supp<)rted by a majority of either House. While it is 
undoubtedly true that a byproduct of legislative cOnlpr~mise is the enactment of items 
that do not stand on their own, the creation of a "super Congress" in the Oval Office is 
surprising. 
Bicameralism and presentment presume that a majority in both [Houses] think it 
better to vote in favor of a bill than against it. While another enactment might be more 
pleasing, all bills presumably further Congress's will. In contrast, S.J. Res. 23, 
recognizing the realities of legislative delegation and horse trading, views many 
provisions as inconsistent with t.he legislative will. On a provision by provision basis, 
there is little doubt that this contention is true. Yet, when one views the legislative_ 
work product as a conglomeration of enactments, the delegation of authority to 
ccmmittee heads and the striking of compromises may well further congressional 
objenth·es. The item veto will undoubtedly affect this dynamic. 
More significant, the President has his own agenda and presumably will use the 
item veto to superimpose his priorities upon Congress. Granted, under S.J. Res. 23, a 
simple majority override is available. Congress, however, may hesitate before it acts 
against ostensible fiscal restraint by the President.. Furthermore, the President decides 
which items are subject to override. Since personal taste and partisan politics will 
preserve some programs at least as wasteful as those item vetoed, the item veto is a 
boon to presidential prerogatives. Needless to say, the two-thirds override required by 
S.J. Res. 14 is an even greater expansion of executive power .. 17 
This expansion of presidential power is likely to encourage political connict. The 
Item veto invites the President to resist compromises and negotiations with Congress. 
Symbolically, the item veto presumes that the "President knows better" when it comes to 
budretary matters. The President also expends little political capital when he exercises 
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this power. Consequently, the President is likely to make use of this budgetary tool. 18 
Sinc" ideology and partisanship will infiuen\!e his use of the item veto, connects between 
the branches-as the states~ experiences reveal-are likely to arise. This connict may 
well result in substantial delays in the enactment of appropriations bills and uncertainty 
on the part of agencies, state governments, and private citize~ regarding their funding 
levels. 
3. The Item Veto and the Courts 
The item veto, of course, will be subject to judicial interpretation and hence some 
attention should be paid to the interpretation controversies surrounding the gubernatorial 
item veto.19 
S.J. Res. 14 and S.J.Res. 23 both envision the item veto as extendi~ to "any item 
of apprclpriation." But what is an "item"? 
Must it be a sentence or. a clause or a word? Must it ~~ 6. 
section, or any part of a section, that may meet with e'tecutive 
disapprobation? May a conditional or a contingent 
appropriation be transformed into an absolute one, in disregard 
and defiance of the legislative will?20 
By the same token, what is an "appropriation"? Is it any matter in an appropriation bill 
or is it any fiscal matter in any bill? 
The range of approaches taken by state judges illustrates the possible reach of 
judicial authority in interpreting these terms. State court interpretations differ on 
several fundamental issuE"s. Some courts emphasize legislative prerogatives, others 
stNII gubernatorial authority. Some courts are literalists in their interpretation of this 
power, others consider the context in which the governor exercises item veto power. 
State courts also differ in their understanding of whether the ~ercise of item veto 
authority is a positive or negative act. Furthermore, these courts are often unable to 
understand the complexities of the budgetary process. Questions concerning spending 
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that occuI"'';; outside tI'H;' a.ppropriations processc for example, have frustrated se"eral state 
courts. 
Because tile courts of different states have a.dopted different perspectives, 
idantical item veto provisions have received quite different interpretations. If the 
President is granted item veto authority, the federal judiciary will be embroiled in some 
of th~ same issues presented in state C'')urts. Federal budgetary decisions are frequently 
made outside the appropriations process. Moreover, Congress often attaches conditions 
to appropriations bills.21 For example, Congr'ess has attached riders to appropriations 
bills that have prohibited federal funding of abortion, restricted American military 
activity during the Vietnam War, and limited efforts by the Internal Revenue Service to 
ensure thl1t private school operations are nondiscriminatory. 
Because so many aspects of the federal lawmaking process are incompatible with 
the item veto, such presidential authority would be subject to more extensive and more 
complicated litigation than the gubernatorial item veto. Federal appropriations bills do 
not currently contain specific items. Additionally, because the federal Constitution does 
not distinguish between appropriations and authorizations, Congress may seek to limit a 
presitjential item veto by funding projects either through the authorization process or 
indirectly through tax laws. The federal courts would inevitably be called upon to 
resolve these ambiguities by dra wing discrete lines of power between the President and 
In the states, court rulings have been instrumental in establishing the scope of the 
gubernatorial item veto. Federal court rulings, undoubtedly, would play an equally 
significant role in determining the reach of the Presidf?nt's item veto authority. The 
federal judiciary might insist that congressional intent be pr.eserved~ thus limiting the 
item veto to dollar amounts .. On the ottier hand, courts migh~~ view th(l! item veto a5 a 
vast e)'!;e(!utive powe" and allow the President to veto conditions on 
UOOr"!f either scenario, the delicate ba1an~,<! of power between the 
/ 
be disrupted by jUdicial [interpretation]. 
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Conclusion 
Item veto proponents do not pretend that this deticit reduction tool will remedy 
this nation's fiscal woes. Nonetheless, proponents are too optimistic in their rosy 
assessment of both the states' experience and the President's ability to serve as 
ncnpartisan deficit reduction czar. Proponents also overstate the damage caused to the 
President's veto by megab!Us. Finally, proponents have not considered the judiciary's 
role in defining the item veto power. 
Great uncertainty surrounds the item veto. A constitutional amendment-which 
presuma.bly will grant the President item veto power now and forever more-is a poor 
device for an item veto experiment. 
,;,," "" ,~ .. , 
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Senator SIMON. Thank you very, very rnuch. 
Dr. Louis Fisher, Senior Am~~rican Specialist, Government Divi-
sion, Congressional Research Service. 
Dr. Fisher. 
STATEMENT OF LOUIS FISHER 
Mr. FISHER. Thank you. I wanted to focus on the question you 
and others have raised of how much would be saved by an item 
veto given to the President. Would it be 10 percent, or $30 billion, 
or what? And what about the State analogy? 
I think a very concrete example of what might be saved was pre-
pared by the Office of Management and Budget last year. If you 
remember, in December IH87, President Reagan signed a monster 
continuing resolution, and 'what he did in March was to send back 
to Congress a document that stated that if I had the item veto 
p01Ner at the time the CR came to me, this is \vhat I would item 
veto. 
It is very clearly stated in here. Someone in OMB went through 
the CR and, with a black pen, boxed out what Reagan would have 
item vetoed. There are several things interesting here. 
First of all, that huge continuing resolution contained about $600 
billion, and we know the budget for that y'ear was about $1 trillion. 
So it means that more than 40 percent of what is appropriated 
every year bypasses the President because it is in permanent ap-
propriation, requiring no annual action. So that part of the picture 
is simply never going to be subject to a President's item veto. 
Now, in the $(-)00 billion, the OMB was able to find $1.5 billion 
that he would have liked to iten1 veto. That is really not an answer 
for budget deficits, and even the $1.{) is very overstated because 
half of that amount consists-not dollars in the appropriation bill, 
but of 1egislative language, particularly for the Small Business Ad-
ministration. That is a question that you can consider. Do you 
want a President to item veto not just dollar amounts or also legis-
la tive language? 
Another interesting point in this document is that someone in 
OMB went through the continuing resolution and struck not the 
dollar amounts, but the proviso, because Congress frequently says 
here is money provided that it is spent in this way. 
This has caused tremendous confusion in the State courts. Can a 
Governor accept an appropriation that has a condition attached to 
it1 keep the moneyt and cut off the condition? Can the Governor 
take a conditional appropriation and convert it into an uncondi~ 
tional appropriation? Is that an executive act? Or is it a legislative 
act, because he is creating som~thing that the legislative body 
never imagined? 
I have read probably 120, laO decisions by State judges on the 
item veto, and they have neVl~r been able to map out any sort of 
coherent theory on h()w to cabin the Governors' item-veto author .. 
ity. 
So I would underscore whut Professor Devins said, that even 
though there is consti tutional language, it is a free for all once it is 
e"ercised by an ambitious executive, and the scope of item·veto aUN 
thority is resolved fai r ly much in the courts. I don't think Federal 
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judges wiH more successful than State judges in being able 
to come up with some principled way to interpret item-veto power. 
What about allowing the President to cut provisos and conditions 
and qualifications? As you know, to get a bill through, you have to 
agree to various compromises, and only then can it leave the legis-
lative body and go to the President. 
I suggest two examples. One would interest a conservative; the 
second would interest a liberal. At the present time, we appropri-
ate money for Medicaid and there is a proviso and a condition that 
it not be spent for abortion, with some conditions. 
Could a President receive money for Medicaid--say, a liberal 
President-and cut off that proviso and use it for abortion? With 
regard to conservatives, the only way in recent years you have 
been able to provide money for the Contras is to provide certain 
conditions that it not be used for lethal aid, that it be for humani-
tarian purposes. 
Could a President receive $50 million, $100 million for the Con-
tras, on the condition that it not be used for lethal aid, and strike 
out that proviso? This is a power that goes far beyond the question 
cutting money and saving money and addressing the deficit. This 
to the whole arrangement by which we make laws in Con-
gress. 
Thank you very much . 
........ "~,.,., .. ".i"' • .ri statement of M r. Fisher foHows:] 
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TESTIMONY OF LOUIS FISHER, CONGRESSION.~ RESEARCH SED,VICE, 
HEARINGS ON THE ITEAI VE1'O, BEFORE 
THE SENATE COMMITrEE ON THE ,fUDICARY, APRIL 1'1, 1989 
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity today to discuSIJ the issue of giving the 
President the power to delete individual items from appropriations bills. My remarks will 
focus on the constitutional amendment you have cosponsored with Senator Dixon (S.J. 
Res. 23). I will also look more broadly at the effect of an item v'eta on budget deficits, 
executive-legislative relations, congressional spending prerogatives, the budget process, and 
the new duties that would be placed on federal courts. 
First, I think the item veto is oversold as a weapon against the current level of 
budget deficits. Evidence for my statement comes from documents prepared by the 
Reagan administration. On March 14, 1988, President Reagan sent to Congress a list of 
"wasteful, unnecessary, or low priority spending projects" in the continuing resoiution for 
fiscal 1988 (P.L. 100-202). He claimed that he would have deleted those projects "if I 
were able to exercise line item veto authority."' 
This document therefore provides a very tangible measure of potential savings from 
the item veto. The continuing resolution contained $603.9 billion in budget authority, 
translating to about $593.2 billion in outlays. (The balance of the trillion dollar budget 
(or tisciJJ 1988 was funded through pe'rm~nent appropriations, requiring no action through 
I H. Doc. No. 100-174, lOOth Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1988). 
annual bills). The list of spending cuts by Reagan, to be achieved through the 
item veto, came only to $969.6 million in budget in outlays. 
Even this $1.5 billion in potential have 
resulted from deleting legislative language for the Sn:.aH UUilUUICl:Nt AllmlmstrBltlCln 
outlays by $728 million. Does the item veto permit deletion not only of ~ppropriations 
(dollar amounts) but legislative language as turn to that later, but if 
the item veto applies only to appropriated 8mlOulnts, 
be substantially less than a billion. That is not an answer to 
of $150 billion a year. 
'The item veto might even increase 
deficits in the range 
sufficient votes to 
support a costly presidential initiative, and White House aides could inform 
Senators and Representatives that particular proJecu m their states or districts are 
candidates for the item veto. At the same would escape no 
one, these executive officials could then inquire mto the mtentions of the legislators when 
the President's program is being voted on the n9t week. A quid pro quo could be 
established, resulting in the retention of the leglslaton' and also passage of the 
President's program. Under thOle pre.ures the roet of government wou~d go up. 
Presidents could &lao uae item-veto power as e:tn leverage for getting treaties and 
nomin_ throup the Senate and pursuing other \\<"1£ .. House objectives. 
This brinp me into the area of executive-legIslative relations. I think the net effect 
of item-veto power will not be budget savings but rather a preference for executive 
spending priorities over legislative spending priorities. I call your attention to a candid 
appraiAl in the Economic Report in 1985, which concluded that the item veto "may not 
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have a substantial effect on total Federal expenditures" but may be used by the President 
"to change the composition of Federal expenditures - from activities preferred by the 
CongresE, to activities preferred by the Preeident:2 Administration officials have been 
equally forthright in the past, explaining that the item veto would be ai~ed at amounts 
that Congress had added to the Presidenes budget.~ 
The same conclusi,"ln is reached by studies at the state leveL The item veto is 
wielded not as an instrument for fiscal restraint but to further the spending goals of the 
executive branch. Of course the record varies from state to stJlt.e, depending on unique 
circumstances in their economies, politics, and pubiic laws. However, the general picture 
does not support the use vf the item veto for budget savinp. It is used instead for 
political and partisan advantages.~ 
If 43 states have adopted the item veto, why doesn't the Federal Government follow 
their lead? Part of the answer, I believe, comes from the special significance of "power 
of the purse" at ths national level. The framers recognized that the long struggle for 
representative government in England evolved from Parliament gaining the power of the 
purse. In making the President Commander in Chief, the framers deliberately separated 
the power of the sword from the power of the purse. The fusion of those two powers at 
2 Economic Report or the President 95 <Feb. 1985). 
3 "Item Veto,· hearings before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 
85th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1957). 
4 For example, see Nice, "The Item Veto and bpenditure Restraint," 50 
J. Pol. 487 (1988); Gosling, "Wisconsin Item-Veto Leaaona: 46 Pub. Adm. Rev. 
292 (1986); Abney & Lauth, "The Line-Item Veto in the States: An Instrument 
for Fiscal Restraint or an Instrument for Parti88D8hip?,. 45 Pub. Adm. Rev. 
372 (1985). 
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the national level represents a much greater tm-eat to individual liberties than :ne 
state level. There are other reasons why the Federal Govenlment has not the 
i tern veto, and I will detail some of those later. 
The question of subordinating Congress to the President's budget has been 
addressed many times. 'Nhen the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 was being drafted, 
some reformers recommended that Congress be prohibited n'om adding to the President's 
budget. Others proposed that Congress would have to seek the approval of the Secretary 
of the Treast ry, or muster a two-thirds majority in each House, in order to add to the 
President's budget. ti 
Congress rejected all of those pre also The budget submitted by the President 
pursuant to the Budget and Acce llmg Act was executive only in the sense that the 
President was responsible fc ~11e estimates. Thereafter it became I:i legislative budget, 
with Congress given power to increase or reduce his estimates. Increases could be 
made in committ· ur on the floor by simple majority vote. The act did not contemplate 
in any the surrender of congressional power. It did not make Congress 
subordinate to the President's spending plan.6 
This drama was replayed when President Nixon resorted to unprecedented use of 
the powe~ to impound funds. The messag'C from the \\'hile House came across without 
equivocation: congressional add-ons to the President's budget were irresponsible and 
wholly lacking in merit. Through impoundment, programs were either cut back to the 
IS L. Fisher, Constitutional Conflicts between Congress and the President 
233 (1985). 
8 H. Kept. No. 14, 67th Cong., 1st Se8B. 6·7 (1921). 
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President's request or, in some Casl~S, terminat.ed and dismanted.7 This theory of 
presidential power was repudiated in almost every case decided by federal judges. 
Congress responded by passing tb,~ Impoundment Control Act of 1974. Some 
iegislators thought that the President's impoundment should remain in effect unless one 
House, or both Houses, acted to disapproye. For example, in 1973 the House of 
Representatives conaidered legislation to ret]uire both Houses ...,.rithin SO days to 
disapprove an impoundment. As reported and passed by the House, disapproval required 
disapproval only by a single chamber. Howt!Y~r, the Senate insisted that the President 
obtain the approval of both Houses. Placing the on the Pretiident was crucial. 
Senator Sam Ervin argued that it would have been demeaning to Congress as an 
institution to act three times to impose its spending priorities: passing b.!1 initial bill, 
overturning the President's veto of that bill, and acting a third time to overturn an 
impoundment proposal. 
These experiences in 1921 and 1974 bear on the item-vl~to power. The struggle for 
spending priorities takes place throughout the process of passing appropriation, 
authorization, and revenue bills. At each stage of that process the executive and 
legislative branches compete for what is added and what is deleted. At some point a 
compromise product is pre~nted to the President, who may either aign or veto the bill. 
Each branch, in that pr0C888, has the opportunity to influence the cont.ent of the bill. 
Permitting the President to item veto the finished bill gives the l~xecutive branch 
a decided advantage. Even if the override requires only a simply majority, as with S.J. 
7 1" Fisher, Presidential Spending Power 175·201 (1975). 
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Res. 23, it is highly unlik(ely that Congress c.a.n prevail in these conflicts. Tb~ past two 
centuries demonstrate that overrides are exceptionally difficult and generallY f.)ccur when 
the President vetoes a general bill, not a specific bill.-
Following this analogy, an item veto of a specific program~ would be less likely to 
klrecipitate a congressioD:Il1 override. Members of Congress from tbe smaller states would 
find it especiaUy difficult to attn. .. Ie votes of colleagues to override the President. The 
states with on~y one or two members in the HOlJse of Representatives '! . vould have little 
chance of achieving an override of a vetoed item, e\""cn with 9. simpie majority. 
These remarks suggest that the item veto might be an effectiv'e way to eliminate 
"wasteful" items added by Congress. Part of the motivation for the item veto comes from 
the belief that Congress irresponsibly adds unwanted riders and amendments to the 
President's requeste. Only with the item veto, it is argued, can the President protect his 
proposed budget frem these extraneous add-ons. 
How this works out in practice is difficult to predict. I thin:lt that the availability 
of an item veto might well make Congress less responsible. Under the present system, 
members of Congress are restrained in adding to a bill because they know, at some point, 
that add-ons will invite a presidential veto. With an item veto, however, the restraint 
would be 1988. To satisfy constituent demands, each member could add extraneous 
material tn a bill with the understanding among all mem'ben that the President i~ free 
to strike the offending amendment. Why challenge these add-ons. in committee or on the 
I Bellamy, "Item Veto: Shield Against Deficits or Weapon of Prasidential 
Power?," 22 Valparaiso U. L. Rev. 557, 576 (1988). 
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floor? Why not shift the responsibility to the Presid~nt and his advisers? Instead 
of adopting a refoi"1D to control logrolling, the item veto enCOU1"8p' this practice. 
Third, let me tum to some other implications for the process. It makes no 
sense to giv~ the President an item veto if thp.re are no items in the bills he receives. 
Unlike the states, which itemize their appropriations bills in great detail to 
such amounts as $2500 for the governor to veto), the spending bills to the 
President contain lump sums. As an example~ take a look at the conat.ru.ction 
account of the Gorps of Engineers, which is regularly accused of prClmOtlng nl1lrllC' •• nAlM"Sl'I-
, . 
projects. The Energy'and Water Development Appropriations Act for fiscal 1989 provides 
$1,066,735,000 for river a'ld harbor, flood control, shore pnltecbon, and related n'l"l".lOl't<l:ll 9 
To determine how that lump sum is to be spent, one must tum to th conference report, 
which spells out in painstaking detail the Qmount8 that go to individua: nrl'llPll"t..a in each 
state. These amounts range from a low of $~f).OOO to Ii 
The point is that none of those project5 {which number almost would be 
subject to the President's item veto. They appear n t.he conference not the bill. 
The misconceptions in this area 8re immenae. In Janusry 1988, in his State of the 
Union Message, President Reagan claimed that with the item veto he could have "pared 
away the waste" in the omnibus appropriation bill he received the previous December. 
To illustrate the programs he would have item-vetoed, he gave four examples: cranberry 
9 102 Stat. 858 (1988). 
!O H. Rept. No. 100-724, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 21-24 (1988). This table 
lists $118,000,000 for the Red River Waterway project in Louisiana, but that 
amount is provided for separately in the appropriations bili and is not part 
of the $1,066,735,000. 
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research, blueberry research, the study of CL8.wfi.h, and the commercialization of 
wildflowers. ''''he simple fact is that he could not have item-vetoed any of the programa 
he mentioned. They were all in the conference report. 
Of course it is possible for Congresa to take the detail in the conference report and 
place it in the bills presented to the President. To that extent we could copy the example 
of the states. There would be two drawbec1u. If Preeidentl complain about the &:ze of 
appropriations bills tiiey receive today, the problem would be magnified many times O\'er 
by including the detailed tables that appear in conference rtport.l. More importantly~ 
adding such details to the bill that bece-mes a public law would rigidify the administrative 
process. This point deserves some elaboration. 
Lump-sum funding offers many advantage& to executive agencies. By receiving a 
lump sum of one billion dollars for construction prGjecta. the Corps of Engineers gains 
valuable flexibility in expending those fundB throughout the fiecal year. If one project ' 
is slowed and another encounters unexpected expenses, funds can be "reprogrammed" 
within the 8"count to meet these needs. Itemization w",uld lock these details into public 
law. Funds could not be moved from one project to another without paaing another 
public law. Neither branch wants that rigidity. Congress bas enough problems passing 
public laws u it is. 
This i8 one important difference between the Federal Government and the states. 
We don't itemize appropriations bills; states do. I see no compelling case to imitate the 
states in this regard. But there are other fundamental differences between the Federal 
Government !lIld t.he states, all of which have been spelled out in some detail in an article 
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that Neal Devins and I did for the ue.r;"M~to:w1& II Copies of that 
article have been made available to your Subcommittee. 
I will dose with some oOOernltiona about the pouible of the item veto on 
the federal courts. S.J. Res. 23 .would the Preeident tc "reduce or 
disapprove any item of appropriation in any Act or joint resolution, except any item of 
appropriation for the legislative branch of the Government," I don't bave space here to 
detail the difficulties that state court.s have encountered in tryiag to define "item" and 
"appropriation." Part of the problems have been explsined in our article for the 
Georgetown Law Journal. A few observations win SUi9;rei,t the dimensions of the problem. 
What is an "appropriation"? Does it include alternative methods of funding a federal 
program, such as a bond authorization or a of generating revenues that are used 
to finance a program? How much could the President's item veto by 
creating a variety of special funds and accounts? Such questions have required state 
courts to examine budgetary issues of excruciating complexity, taxing the competence of 
judges and thrusting them often in the middle of leRjlllllti·ve-ex.~u.ti\l·e confrontations. 
What is an "item"? II it only the dollar amount or also a word? The problems here 
have been legion, with governors deleting individual words and even separate letters. The 
result has been the creation of statutory language never intended by the legislature. Can 
the executive delete language, including conditions attached to an appropriation? 
Probably no issue has confused the state courts more. Through the use of the item veto 
J I Fisher & Devins, ~ow Successfully Can the States' Item Veto Be 
Transferred to the President?," 75 Gee. L. J. 159 (1986). 
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can a governor convert a conditional appropriation into an unconditional appropriation? 
Is that an "executive" act or does it more closely resemble a "legislative" act, producing in 
effect a n~w law? 
State courts, after struggling with these questions for the last century, have yet to 
discover a set of coherent principles to guide their decisions. Many state judges recognize 
that their efforts in defining the scope of the item veto have been largely subjective, ad 
hoc, and idiosyncratic. There is little reason to think that federal judges win be more 
successful. Federal courts will be drawn increasingiy into budgetary disputes between 
Congress and the President. Moreover, the scope of the item veto win be defined not by 
constitutional language but by an uncertain and fluctuating combination of presidential 
initiatives and judicial rulings. 
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Senator SIMON. Thank you. Just for the record, so there is no 
question about our intent, we are not talking about the President 
vetoing legislative language or changing the intent by vetoing pro-
visos. We are talking only about dollar amounts. 
Let me just ask one question of all of you because, clearly, we 
face a major problem. My friend from the AFL-CIO joins me in 
wanting to have more money for education, more money for health 
care, and so forth. But I see interest growing just-you know, the 
fastest growing item in the budget is interest. 
The gross interest expenditure growth in fiscal year 1990 over 
fiscal year 1989 will be greater than the total amount that we 
spend on all of our education programs, if you exclude the School 
Lunch Program. You know, we are not meeting the kinds of needs 
that we ought to be meeting. 
Have any of you thought at all about strengthening the rescis-
sion powers that the President has, and would you be in favor of 
anything that would in any way strengthen that at all, if I may 
ask all three of you that? 
Mr. CANTOR. I really haven't thought about it, quite frankly. It 
seems to me tnat the current rescission po\vers of the President are 
adequate, and I would be remiss, Senator, if I didn't get OH the 
record that I am a little troubled by the entire hearing's exclusive 
emphasis on the spending side of the equation every time the issue 
of how this can help on the deficit conles up. 
You know, as you articulated, \ve certainly share your feelings 
about education and training and public investment programs. I 
don't see how a measure geared to budget deficit reduction could 
help in those areas, if any nloney that is saved is used to reduce 
the deficit, You are certainly not putting the expenditures in other 
places. 
A I was kind of disturbed t hat the revenue side of the budget 
hasn't been mentioned at all in this. 
Senator SIMON. Well, I am one \vho is on the Budget Committee; 
I have been clear. I think we have to have additional revenue, but 
it is tied in with the deficit. You reduce a $2.7 trillion indebtedness, 
and you reduce interest rates 1 percent. 
Mr. CANTOR. Sure. 
Senator SIMON. While the first year you don't save $27 billion, 
you will ultimately save $27 billion a year, plus. And if you use 
one-half of that to reduce the deficit and the other one-half for pro-
grams that this country needs, we would be infinitely better off all 
the way around, in addition to the very fact that reducing interest 
rates would stimulate the economy. 
Any comments by either of you on the rescission? 
Mr. DEVINS. Assuming that it is the proposal now before Con-
gress in which the burden is placed on both Houses of Congress to 
override a rescission, you are going to face many of the same prob-
lems that you do with the item veto. Take the problem of the Presi-
dent exercising his priorities over those of Congress. Even assum-
ing that is a simple majority override, it will be difficult for Con-
gress to strike back at the President. First, the President controls 
that which is rescinded and, second, Congress will have difficulty 
being able to even muster a simple majority override. 
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Problems on the item-veto side of the equation are not solved by 
utilizing an enhanced rescission mechanism. 
Senator SIMON. Dr. Fisher. 
Mr. FISHER. I would be concerned about enhanced rescission. 
Right now the way the process works, legislators get a chance to 
have their priorities in the bill, the executive branch has a chance, 
and a bargain has been struck and it goes up to the President. If he 
doesn't like it, then he can veto the whole thing. 
To have the burden reversed so that he can propose certain re-
scissions and the burden is placed on both Houses to act within a 
certain time to disapprove-and if they disapprove, of course, it 
would have to be in a\,bill or joint resolution, which would go back 
to the President and he could veto that. Now they need a two-
thirds to maintain their priorities. 
I talk about that a little in my paper, and I think that is a very 
ill advised process where Congress, in order to protect priorities, 
needs an extraordinary majority, a tvvo-thirds in each House. Oth-
erwise, the President's priorities prevail. 
That was debated in 1921 on the Budget and Accounting Act; it 
was debated again in 1974 with the Budget Act. Congress every 
time has ahvays insisted that it act just through 11lajority vote 
unless the President exercised a regular veto. 
Senator SIMON. I thank vou verv, very much for vour testimony. 
Our hearing stands adjolirned. ~ ~ ~ ~ 
[Whereupon, at 1:21 p.ll)', the subconunittee \\'as adjourned.] 
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